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Abstract Cooperation in joint enterprises poses a social dilemma. How can
altruistic behavior be sustained if selfish alternatives provide a higher payoff?
This social dilemma can be overcome by the threat of sanctions. But a
sanctioning system is itself a public good and poses a second-order social
dilemma. In this paper, we show by means of deterministic and stochastic
evolutionary game theory that imitation-driven evolution can lead to the
emergence of cooperation based on punishment, provided the participation
in the joint enterprise is not compulsory. This surprising result—cooperation
can be enforced if participation is voluntary—holds even in the case of ‘strong
altruism’, when the benefits of a player’s contribution are reaped by the other
participants only.
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1 Introduction
Team efforts and other instances of ‘public good games’ display a social
dilemma, since each participant is better off by not contributing to the public
good. If players maximize their utility in a rational way, or if they simply
imitate their successful co-players, they will all end up by not contributing, and
hence fail to obtain a collective benefit (Samuelson 1954; Hardin 1968). It is
only through positive or negative incentives directed selectively toward specific
individuals in the team (e.g. by imposing sanctions on cheaters or dispensing
rewards to contributors) that the joint effort can be maintained in the long run
(Olson 1965; Ostrom 1990).
But how can the sanctioning system be sustained? It is itself a public good
(Yamagishi 1986). This creates a ‘second order social dilemma’. By appealing
to localised interactions (Brandt et al. 2003; Nakamaru and Iwasa 2005), group
selection (Boyd et al. 2003), or the effects of reputation (Sigmund et al. 2001;
Hauert et al. 2004) and conformism (Henrich and Boyd 2001), the stability
of a well-established system of incentives can be explained under appropriate
conditions. However, the emergence of such a system has long been considered
an open problem (Hammerstein 2003; Gardner and West 2004; Colman 2006;
see also Fowler 2005a).
A series of papers (Fowler 2005b; Brandt et al. 2006; Hauert et al. 2007;
Boyd and Mathew 2007; Hauert et al. 2009) has recently attempted to provide a
solution by considering team efforts which are non-compulsory. If players can
decide whether to participate in a joint enterprise or abstain from it, then costly
punishment can emerge and prevail for most of the time, even if the population
is well-mixed. If the same joint effort game is compulsory, punishers fail to
invade and defection dominates.
Roughly speaking, the joint enterprise is a venture. It succeeds if most play-
ers contribute, but not if most players cheat. The availability of punishment
turns this venture into a game of cops and robbers. If the game is compulsory,
robbers win. But if the game is voluntary, cops win.
This effect is due to a rock-paper-scissors type of cycle between contribut-
ing, defecting and abstaining. Players who do not participate in the joint en-
terprise can rely on some autarkic income instead. We shall assume that their
income is lower than the payoff obtained from a joint effort if all contribute,
but higher than if no one contributes. (Only with this assumption does the joint
effort turn into a venture.) In a finite population, cooperation evolves time and
again, although it will then be quickly subverted by defection, which in turn
gives way to non-participation (Hauert et al. 2002a, b; Semmann et al. 2003). If
costly punishment of defectors is included in the game, then eventually one of
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the upsurges of cooperation will lead to a population dominated by punishers,
and such a regime will last considerably longer before defectors invade again.
Cooperation safeguarded by the costly punishment of defectors dominates
most of the time.
This model has been based on the classical ‘public good game’ used in
many theoretical and experimental investigations (Boyd and Richerson 1992;
Camerer 2003; Fehr and Gächter 2000, 2002; Hauert et al. 2007; Brandt et al.
2003; Nakamaru and Iwasa 2006). It suffers from a weakness which makes it
less convincing than it could be. Indeed, whenever the interacting groups are
very small (as happens if most players tend not to participate in the joint ef-
fort), the social dilemma disappears; it only re-appears when the game attracts
sufficiently many participants. In a frequently used terminology, cooperation
in such a public good game is ‘weakly altruistic’, because cooperators receive
a return from their own contribution (Kerr and Godfrey-Smith 2002; Fletcher
and Zwick 2004, 2007, see also Wilson 1990 for a related notion).
In this note, we show that the same result—in compulsory games, robbers
win; in optional games, cops do—holds also for ‘strong altruism’, or more
precisely in the ‘others-only’ case, i.e. when no part of the benefit returns to
the contributor. It is always better, in that case, not to contribute. Nevertheless,
cooperation based on costly punishment emerges, if players can choose not to
participate. If the game is compulsory, defectors will win.
According to the ‘weak altruism’ model, players have to decide whether or
not to contribute an amount c, knowing that the joint contributions will be
multiplied by a factor r > 1 and then divided equally among all S participants.
Rational players understand that if they invest an amount c, their personal
return is rc/S. If the group size S is larger than r, their return is smaller than
their investment, and hence they are better off by not contributing. In that case,
we encounter the usual social dilemma: a group of selfish income maximizers
will forgo a benefit, by failing to earn (r − 1)c each. The proverbial ‘invisible
hand’ fails to work. However, if the group size S is smaller than r, selfish players
will contribute, since the return from their personal investment c is larger than
their investment. In that case, the social dilemma has disappeared.
In all the models of voluntary public good games mentioned so far, it has
been assumed that a random sample of the population of size N is faced with
the decision whether or not to participate in a game of the ‘weakly altruistic’
type described above. If most players tend not to participate, the resulting
teams will mostly have a small size S, and therefore the social dilemma will not
hold. (This effect of population size is well-known, see eg. Pepper 2000). Small
wonder, then, that cooperation emerges in such a situation. A well-meaning
colleague even called it a ‘sleight of hand’.
In the ‘strong altruism’ variant considered here, players have to decide
whether or not to contribute an amount c, knowing that it will be multiplied
by a factor r > 1 and then divided equally among all the other members of
the group. A player’s contribution benefits the others only. The social dilemma
always holds, in this case, no matter whether the group is large or small. We
shall show that nevertheless, a rock-paper-scissor cycle leading to cooperation
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still emerges, and that the population will be dominated by players who punish
defectors. This is a striking instance of the general phenomenon that complex
dynamics can play an important role even in very simple types of economic
models (see eg Kirman et al. 2004).
Before proceeding, a terminological remark is in order. The traditional term
for the interactions we are considering is ‘public goods games’. For the variants
discussed here, the term is misleading. Indeed, public goods are by definition
non-excludable. Why should a player, in the ‘others only’ version, be prevented
from using the result of the own contribution? Moreover, it goes against the
definition of non-excludability to assume that players can abstain, or for that
matter that they can be forbidden to use the good via ostracism, for instance.
Instead of public goods game, we therefore use the term joint effort game, but
want to emphasize that it is just a re-christening of a traditional model.
The idea of considering a joint effort game of ‘others only’ type is not new.
It was used in Yamagishi (1986), a brilliant forerunner to Fehr and Gächter
(2000). Yamagishi’s motivation was interesting: he made ‘public good game’
experiments using small groups (the small size is almost a necessity, due to
practical reasons), but he wanted to address the issue of public goods in very
large groups. Since in large groups, the effect of an individual decision is almost
negligible, Yamagishi opted for a treatment which excludes any return from
the own contribution.
In this paper, we investigate the evolutionary dynamics of voluntary joint
effort games with punishment, using for the joint effort interaction the ‘others-
only’ variant OO rather than the ‘self-returning’ (or ‘self-beneficial’) variant
SR. We consider the evolutionary dynamics in well mixed populations which
can either be infinite (in which case we analyze the replicator dynamics, see
Hofbauer and Sigmund 1998), or of a finite size M (in which we case we use a
Moran-like process, see Nowak 2006). We will show that for finite populations,
voluntary participation is just as efficient for ‘strong altruism’ as for ‘weak
altruism’. Thus even if the social dilemma holds consistently, cooperation
based on costly punishment emerges.
In the usual scenarios, it is well-known that while weakly altruistic traits
can increase, strongly altruistic traits cannot (see e.g. Kerr and Godfrey-Smith
2002). Our paper shows, in contrast, that strongly altruistic behavior can spread
if players can inflict costly punishment on defectors and if they can choose
not to participate in the team effort. In a sense to be explained later, the
mechanism works even better than for weak altruism.
2 The model
We consider a well-mixed population, which is either infinite or of finite size
M. From time to time, a random sample of size N is presented with the
opportunity to participate in a ‘joint effort game’. Those who decline (the non-
participants) receive a fixed payoff σ which corresponds to an autarkic income.
Those who participate have to decide whether or not to contribute a fixed
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amount c. In the ‘self-returning’ case SR, the contribution will be multiplied
by a factor r and the resulting ‘public good’ will be shared equally among
all participants of the game; in the ‘others-only’ case OO, it will be shared
among all the other participants of the game. (We note that in this case, if there
are only two participants, we obtain a classical Prisonners’ Dilemma scenario,
which can be interpreted as a donation game: namely whether or not to provide
a benefit b = rc to the co-player at a cost c to oneself, with r > 1).
In both types of joint effort games, the participants obtain their share
irrespective of whether they contributed or not (it is in this sense that the
participants create a public good that is non-excludable within the group
of participants). If only one player in the sample decides to participate, we
shall assume that the joint effort game cannot take place. Such a player
obtains the same payoff σ as a non-participant. This concludes the first stage
of the interaction. In the second stage, participants in the game can decide
to punish the cheaters in their group. Thus we consider four strategies:
(1) non-participants; (2) cooperators, who participate and contribute, but do
not punish; (3) defectors, who participate, but neither contribute nor punish;
and (4) punishers, who participate, contribute, and punish the defectors in their
group. Needless to say, other strategies could also be investigated. We return to
this issue in the discussion. The relative frequencies of cooperators, defectors,
non-participants and punishers in the infinite population will be denoted
by x, y, z and w, and their numbers in the finite population by X, Y, Z
and W, respectively (with X + Y + Z + W = M, and x + y + z + w = 1).
Their frequencies in a given random sample of size N are denoted by
Nx, Ny, Nz and Nw respectively (with Nx + Ny + Nz + Nw = N, and Nx +
Ny + Nw = S the number of participants in the public good game).
Following the usual models, we shall assume that in the second stage of the
game, each punisher imposes a fine β on each defector, at some cost γ , so that
punishers have to pay γ Ny and defectors βNw. The total payoff is the sum
of a ‘public good term’ (which covers the first stage of the interaction) and a
punishment term (which covers the second stage).
3 The infinite population case
Let us assume first that the population size is infinite. Each players’ payoff is
the sum of a public good term (which is σ if the player does not participate
in the joint effort) and a punishment term (which is 0 for non-participants
and cooperators). The expected punishment terms are easily seen to be
−βw(N − 1) for the defectors and −γ y(N − 1) for the punishers.
As shown in Brandt et al. (2006), the public good term of the payoff is given
in the SR case by
σzN−1 + rc(x + w)FN(z)
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for the defectors, and
σzN−1 + c(r − 1)(1 − zN−1) − rcyFN(z)
for the cooperators and the punishers, with
FN(z) = 11 − z
(
1 − 1 − z
N
N(1 − z)
)
.
The payoff for non-participants is σ . As shown in the Appendix, the return
from the joint effort in the OO case is
σzN−1 + (1 − zN−1) rc(x + w)
1 − z ,
which is the public good term for defectors. The public good term for cooper-
ators and punishers is the same term, reduced by c
(
1 − zN−1) (this is the cost
of contributing, given that there is at least one co-player).
Let us now consider the replicator dynamics for the OO-case. After remov-
ing the common term σzN−1 from all payoffs, we obtain for the expected payoff
values of non-participants, defectors, cooperators and punishers
Pz =
(
1 − zN−1) σ
Py =
(
1 − zN−1)
(
rc
x + w
1 − z
)
− βw(N − 1)
Px =
(
1 − zN−1)
(
rc
x + w
1 − z − c
)
Pw =
(
1 − zN−1)
(
rc
x + w
1 − z − c
)
− γ y(N − 1)
In the interior of the simplex S4 there is no fixed point since Pw < Px. Hence
all orbits converge to the boundary (see Hofbauer and Sigmund 1998). On
the face w = 0, we find a rock-paper-scissors game, as in the SR case: non-
participants are dominated by cooperators who are dominated by defectors
who are dominated by non-participants again. In the interior of this face there
is no fixed point, since Px < Py; all orbits are homoclinic orbits, converging
to the non-participant state z = 1 if time converges to ±∞ (see Fig. 1). This
contrasts with the SR case, where the face w = 0 is filled with periodic orbits
for r > 2 (see also the corresponding phase portraits in Brandt et al. 2006).
It is easy to see that punishers dominate non-participants, and that pun-
ishers and defectors form a bistable system if c + γ < β(N − 1). The edge of
cooperators and punishers (y = z = 0) consists of fixed points, those with
w >
c
β(N − 1)
are saturated and hence Nash-equilibria.
Altogether, this system has a remarkable similarity with the replicator
system for SR originally proposed by Fowler (2005b) (and criticized by Brandt
et al. 2006), provided Fowler’s second-order punishment term is neglected.
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Fig. 1 The replicator equation for the OO-case. Part a shows the phase portrait on the boundary
faces of the state space simplex S4. Part b shows what happens in the interior of the simplex.
Bright orbits converge to the state z of only non-participants, despite the local instability of this
fixed point. Dark orbits converge to a cooperative mixture of punishers w and cooperators x.
The starting points of the orbits are depicted in gray. Parameter values are N = 5, r = 3, c = 1,
β = 1.2, γ = 1 and σ = 1
4 Finite populations
We now turn to finite populations of size M. As learning rule, we shall use the
familiar Moran-like process: we assume that occasionally, players can update
their strategy by copying the strategy of a ‘model’, namely a player chosen at
random with a probability which is proportional to that player’s fitness. This
fitness in turn is assumed to be a convex combination (1 − s)B + sP, where B
is a ‘baseline fitness’ (the same for all players), P is the payoff (which depends
on the strategy, and the state of the population), and 0 ≤ s ≤ 1 measures
the ‘strength of selection’, i.e. the importance of the game for overall fitness.
We shall always assume s small enough to avoid negative fitness values. This
learning rule corresponds to a Markov process. We note that in the limiting
case of an infinite population, the rate for switching from strategy j to strategy i
is (1 − s)B + sPi (with i, j ∈ {x, y, z, w}), independently of j, see Traulsen et al.
(2005). According to Hofbauer and Sigmund (1998), this leads to the replicator
equation. For finite populations, the Markov process has four absorbing states,
namely the homogeneous states: if all players use the same strategy, imitation
leads to nothing new. Hence we assume that with a small ‘mutation probability’
μ, players chose a strategy at random, rather than imitate another player. This
yields an irreducible Markov chain with a unique stationary distribution. (We
emphasize that the terms ‘selection’ and ‘mutation’ are used for convenience
only, and do not imply a genetic transmission of strategies.)
210 H. De Silva et al.
In the limiting case of small mutation rates μ << M−2, we can assume
that the population consists, most of the time, of one type only. Mutants
occur rarely, and will be eliminated, or have reached fixation, before the
next mutation occurs. Hence we can study this limiting case by an embed-
ded Markov chain with four states only. These are the four homogeneous
states, with the population consisting of only cooperators, only defectors, only
non-participants or only punishers, respectively. It is now easy to compute
the transition probabilities. For instance, ρxy denotes the probability that a
mutant defector can invade a population of cooperators and reach fixation.
The corresponding stationary distribution (πx, πy, πz, πw) describes how often
(on average) the population is dominated by cooperators, defectors etc.
The transition probabilities are given by formulas of the type
ρxy =
[
1 +
M−1∑
k=1
k∏
X=1
1 − s + sPXY
1 − s + sPY X
]−1
where PXY denotes the payoff obtained by a cooperator in a population
consisting of X cooperators and Y = M − X defectors (see Nowak 2006).
Hence all that remains is to compute these expressions. Again, these payoffs
consist of two terms: the contribution from the public good round, and those
from the punishment round.
Clearly, if there are W punishers and Y defectors (with W + Y = M), the
former must pay γ Y(N − 1)/(M − 1) and the latter βW(N − 1)/(M − 1) on
average.
The payoff obtained from the public good term has been computed in
Hauert et al. (2007) for the SR-case. We now compute it for the OO-case.
In a population consisting of X cooperators and Y = M − X defectors, a
co-operator obtains
cr(X − 1)
M − 1 − c.
Defectors in a population of Y defectors and X = M − Y cooperators (or
punishers) obtain from the public good
cr(M − Y)
M − 1 .
The probability to be the only participant in the sample is
( Z
N−1
)
(M−1
N−1
) = Z N−1
(M − 1)N−1 ,
where Zk := Z (Z − 1)...(Z − k + 1). Hence in a population with Z non-
participants, if the rest is composed only of punishers (or of cooperators), the
participants obtain from the public good
σ
Z N−1
(M − 1)N−1 + c(r − 1)
(
1 − Z N−1
(M − 1)N−1
)
.
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In a population consisting only of punishers and cooperators, the public good
term of the payoff is
rc(N − 1)
N − 1 − c = c(r − 1).
We can now compute the stationary distributions. As shown in Figs. 2
and 3, the outcome is clear: in the compulsory case, defectors take over; in
the optional case, punishers dominate. The results are derived for the limiting
case of very small mutation rates (μ << M−2), but computer simulations
show that they are valid for larger mutation rates too. In interactive com-
puter simulations (see for instance http://www.wu-wien.ac.at/usr/ma/hbrandt/
simulations.html and http://www.univie.ac.at/virtuallabs/), it is possible to ex-
periment with different parameter values (for M, N, σ, r, c, β and γ ) and with
other learning processes, which provide convincing evidence that the outcome
is robust. We note in particular that punishers are even more frequent for the
strongly altruistic ‘others-only’ scenario than for the weakly altruistic ‘self-
returning’ variant. The reason behind this seems to be that the cooperators
are less frequent in the OO-case (and each percent they lose is gained by the
punishers). Why are they less frequent? In the SR case, cooperators can invade
non-participants more easily, since they do get a return for their contribution.
However, such an invasion has no lasting effect, because the cheaters can
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Fig. 2 Time evolution of the frequencies in a finite population a if all four strategies are allowed
and b if the game is compulsory, i.e. if there are no non-participants. We see that in the latter
case, defectors quickly come to near-fixation; in the former case, a rock-paper-scissors type of
cycle leads eventually to a cooperative regime dominated by punishers, which lasts for a long time.
(It will eventually by subverted through random drift, in which case the oscillations start again).
(Parameter values as in Fig. 1 with M = 100, μ = 0.001, B = 1, s = 0.1)
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Cooperators Defectors Non-participants Punishers
Fig. 3 The frequencies of strategies in the stationary distribution, as a function of the selection
strength s. a In the case of weak altruism, the punisher’s strategy is the most frequent; b this also
holds for strong altruism, with the additional feature that non-punishing cooperators are even less
frequent; c if the game is compulsory (i.e. non-participants are excluded from the simulations), the
defectors emerge as clear winners. This is shown here for the case of strong altruism, the weak-
altruism case is similar. The lines describe the frequencies as computed in the limiting case μ → 0.
The dots describe the results of numerical simulations averaged over 107 periods for μ = 0.001.
Parameter values are M = 100, N = 5, r = 3, c = 1, β = 1, γ = 0.3, σ = 1 and B = 1
quickly replace the cooperators. All that these short episodes of cooperation
without punishment achieve is that they stand in the way of cooperation with
punishment.
5 Discussion
As we have shown, individual-based selection can lead to the emergence
of cooperation based on punishment, even in situations of so-called ‘strong
altruism’ (in particular, when the own contribution yields zero benefit to
contributors, and only entails costs). This requires that the participation to the
joint effort is voluntary, rather than compulsory.
We have dealt with a model which has been frequently used and by now
can almost be viewed as traditional. It may be appropriate here to stress its
limitations. First of all, peer-punishment of cheaters is certainly not the only
way to promote cooperation in a joint effort. Other forms of sanctions are
possible, and so are positive incentives (for instance, through additional rounds
of indirect reciprocity, see Milinski et al. 2002 and Panchanathan and Boyd
2006). The threat of ostracizing defectors from future joint effort games is also
very effective, see Güth et al. (2007)). As mentioned already in Hauert et al.
(2007), the connection between ostracism cheaters and voluntary abstention
from a joint effort demands to be studied.
Second, the restricted number of strategies is a feature justified only by
the need to simplify the analysis. Many more strategies are conceivable. For
instance, the decision to participate or not, or to punish or not, could depend
on the number of like-minded players in the sample. Defectors could punish
other players, or retaliate against punishment. Punishers could also punish
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non-participants, or cooperators who do not punish (second-order punish-
ment). However, numerical simulations for the self-returning case have shown
that these effects are usually small. In particular, second-order punishers can
single out cooperators unwilling to punish only if there are defectors around:
this requires the simultaneous presence of three types, which is unlikely in a
finite population if μ is sufficiently small. Moreover, experimental evidence for
second-order punishment is rather scarce. Nevertheless, it would be interesting
to include other strategies into the analysis of joint effort games.
Punishment of free riders is widespread in human societies (Ostrom 1990;
Ostrom and Walker 2003; Henrich et al. 2006; Sigmund 2007). The main result
of our paper is that a joint effort game with punishment is much more likely
to lead to a cooperative outcome if participation is voluntary, rather than
compulsory. For the ‘weakly altruistic’ SR case, this is well established, see
Hauert et al. (2007, 2009). But here, we show that it also holds in the ‘strongly
altruistic’ OO-case, i.e. if the benefit of a contribution is exclusively directed
at others.
The mechanism thus operates without a ‘sleight of hand’. The fact that in
sufficiently small groups playing the SR public goods game, it is in the selfish
interest of a player to contribute, is not essential. Even if the social dilemma is
unmitigated, as in the OO case, voluntary participation allows cooperators to
emerge again and again from a population of non-participants. Indeed, if non-
participants are frequent, the random samples of N players will usually provide
only small groups willing to participate in the public goods game. In such small
groups, it can happen by chance that most members contribute. These groups
will have a high payoff and their members will be quickly imitated.
This is an instance of the well-known Simpson’s paradox (see Sober and
Wilson 1998): although within each group, free-riders do better than contribu-
tors, in can happen that on average, across the whole population, contributors
do better than free-riders. A similar effect also holds in a model of Killingback
et al. (2006): in that scenario, the population is structured in groups of variable
size, with dispersal between groups, whereas our model considers individual
selection in a well-mixed population. For other investigations of the effect
of finite population size and stochastic shocks, see e.g. (Peyton Young and
Foster 1995).
Non-punishing cooperators can invade a population of non-participants.
However, this state will quickly be invaded by defectors, who in turn foster
non-participation. But the resulting rock-paper-scissors cycle, which can be
viewed as an extremely simple model of an endogenous business cycle (cf Dosi
et al. 2006), will eventually lead from non-participants to punishers (rather
than to non-punishing cooperators). In that case defectors will have a much
harder time to come back.
In their lucid discussion of strong vs. weak altruism, Fletcher and Zwick
(2007) argue that what counts for selection are fitness differences, i.e. relative
fitnesses rather than absolute fitnesses (cf Hamilton 1975 and Wilson 1975).
Although with weak altruism (which has been called ‘benevolence’ by Nunney
2000), a contribution directly benefits the contributor, it benefits the co-players
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just as well. Even if the return to the contributor exceeds the cost of the
contribution, defectors in the public goods group are still better off. In this
sense, the difference between weak and strong altruism is less than may
appear, despite the ‘conventional wisdom’ (Fletcher and Zwick 2007) stating
that under the usual assumptions, weak altruism evolves and strong altruism
does not.
In particular, while most models leading to cooperation assume weak altru-
ism, Fletcher and Zwick (2004) have shown that strong altruism can prevail in
public goods games of ‘others-only’ type if groups are randomly reassembled,
not every generation, but every few generations. Our scenario emphasizes a
different, but related point. In voluntary public goods games with punishment,
for strong and weak altruism alike, cooperation can emerge through individual
selection.
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Appendix
In the OO case, the public goods term of the payoff can be computed as
follows: The probability that a focal player has h co-players who partici-
pate is
(
N − 1
h
)
(1 − z)hzN−1−h
for h = 0, ..., N − 1. The probability that m of these are contributing is
(
h
m
)(
x + w
1 − z
)m ( y
1 − z
)h−m
for m = 0, ..., h (if h > 0).
The focal player’s expected gain stemming from the h co-participants is
h∑
m=0
rcm
h
(
h
m
) (
x + w
1 − z
)m ( y
1 − z
)h−m
= rc(x + w)
1 − z ,
which is independent of h (for h = 1, ..., N − 1).
Hence the payoff obtained from the joint effort is given by
σzN−1 + rc(x + w)
(
1 − zN−1)
1 − z
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for a defector. Cooperators and punishers obtain as public goods term the
same, reduced by c
(
1 − zN−1).
We now compute the public goods terms for the finite OO-case. In a
population of size M with mi individuals of type i and m j = M − mi of type j,
the probability to select k individuals of type i and N − k individuals of type j
in N trials is
H(k, N, mi, M) =
(mi
k
)(M−mi
N−k
)
(M
N
) . (1)
Therefore, in a population consisting of X cooperators and Y = M − X
defectors, a co-operator obtains (if k is the number of other cooperators)
N−1∑
k=0
H(k, N − 1, X − 1, M − 1)
(
rck
N − 1 − c
)
= rc
N − 1
N−1∑
k=0
kH(k, N − 1, X − 1, M − 1)
− c
N−1∑
k=0
H(k, N − 1, X − 1, M − 1).
Since the first sum is (X − 1) N−1M−1 and the second is 1, this yields
cr(X − 1)
M − 1 − 1.
Defectors in a population of Y defectors and X = M − Y cooperators or
punishers obtain from the public good
N−1∑
k=0
H(k, N − 1, X, M − 1)
(
rkc
N − 1
)
= cr(M − Y)
M − 1 .
The probability to be the only participant in the sample is
( Z
N−1
)
(M−1
N−1
) = Z N−1
(M − 1)N−1 .
Hence in a population with Z non-participants, if the rest is composed only
of punishers (or of cooperators), the participants obtain from the public good
σ
Z N−1
(M − 1)N−1 + c(r − 1)
(
1 − Z N−1
(M − 1)N−1
)
.
In a population consisting only of punishers and cooperators, the public
good term of the payoff is
rc(N − 1)
N − 1 − c = c(r − 1).
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